Anachronistic Kantian Dialogue

On Autonomy
What is autonomy?
• That I give myself a law, which I act upon. Auto : Self. Nomos : Law.
Can you give yourself any law you choose?
• Yes, of course. That’s why its autonomy.
Can you give yourself a law that is unjust?
• Yes. I’m autonomous.
Should someone submit to/obey an unjust law?
• Of course not.
If someone can’t be expected to obey a law, and in fact, should not, is it even a law?
• No.
So, if autonomy is the giving of one’s self the laws of one’s actions, then to give one’s self an unjust law wouldn’t be autonomy would it?
• I don’t follow.
You are giving the law, so the pre-fix “auto” applies, yes?
• Of course.
But if an unjust law is no law at all, then the greek suffix “nomos” would not apply. Do you agree?
• I’m still not following.
The autonomous person gives themselves the law of their action, and what is being given by the self here is NOT a law. The self and the giving remain, but the law would be excluded by the injustice “prescribed,” correct?
• Ah, yes, indeed.
So, the autonomous person must be just? Insofar as one is unjust, one fails to be autonomous?
• But that seems a constraint upon the autonomous person!
Indeed, but isn’t it only a constraint of rationality in the most basic sense?
• How do you mean?
The principle of non-contradiction is an indemonstrable first principle of reason. By it, we know that an unjust law is not a law, because justice is analytically contained in the concept of law. It cannot both be a law and not-a-law (unjust) at the same time and in the same respect.
• Oh…right. But its still a constraint upon my autonomy, however minimal, necessary and basic.
If the autonomy of every possible person falls under the same “constraint,” as you call it, wouldn’t that constraint be the bounds of the universal. Though definite, it would be absolute. Could there be any “beyond” into which to go, unrestrained by the PNC?
• Well, one would bound into nothingness, it seems.
So, would you like to have the freedom to give a nothing-law to yourself? To give a not-law? That, too, would be not-autonomy, for there would be neither a law to give, nor a self to give it, nor giving.
• No, I suppose that nothing is opposed to autonomy.
Indeed!